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What can words do?   
Debating a “good” death in French palliative care 
Kimberly A. Arkin 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the ambivalent ways that care providers in a southern French hospital (the 
Center) thought about patient subjectivities and the power and role of language as they argued 
about how to orchestrate a “good” death in palliative care.  By analyzing the case of Monsieur 
Rami, a 67 year-old Moroccan-born immigrant who died of metastatic cancer in the summer of 
2017, I argue against the presumption that individual autonomy, rational choice, and linguistic 
transparency are hegemonic in Western Europe, particularly in biomedical domains.  Instead, I 
use the disagreements and frustrations that surrounded Monsieur Rami’s last weeks to trace out 
the variety of conflicting ways that care providers talked about his family entanglements, the role 
of cognitive knowledge and “choice” in end-of-life care, and the power of language itself.  Care 
providers in the Center certainly sometimes characterized Monsieur Rami as a (potentially) 
autonomous, choosing individual who required transparent communication about his prognosis 
and diagnosis.  But such characterizations served as ideological weapons in battles care providers 
were fighting amongst themselves over their own contradictory ethical commitments.  And in 
palliative care, those competing ethical commitments were often grounded in assumptions about 
intersubjectivity and irrationality, as well as the performative power of words.  
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In early June of 2017, 67-year-old Monsieur Rami was admitted to a government-funded 
French Cancer Center (hereafter the Center) for pain and general deterioration.1  He had last been 
treated at the Center for metastatic ear, nose, and throat cancer in March 2017, when he was told 
that there were no more treatment options for his condition.  At that point, he and his wife 
returned to Morocco, their country of origin, to see family members and perhaps—rumor had 
it—solicit the services of a traditional healer.  It was now summer and Ramadan.  Heat and 
exhaustion had driven them both back to southern France and directly to the Center, where 
 
1 I have disguised the city and the institution in which I did my research.  All names are pseudonyms. 
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Monsieur Rami was being treated for pain and for an increasingly crippling cough associated 
with lung lesions.   
Within three weeks, Monsieur Rami was dead and the internal medicine and palliative 
care teams2 that had been treating him were in turmoil.   In the weeks prior to his death, 
Monsieur Rami’s medical team had—in increasingly frantic ways—described his case as a 
“problem” that eluded solution.  In the end, a number of the doctors and nurses on the palliative 
care team insisted that Monsieur Rami had died a “bad” death, the kind of death that palliative 
care was supposed to have eliminated.  In the final hours of his life, as his respiratory distress 
increased, he had stopped taking the analgesics that were palliating his pain; he had also refused 
to be sedated when he started to suffocate.  Many of his nurses and doctors attributed this “bad” 
death to an endless series of communicative failures that deprived Monsieur Rami of his 
autonomy and a say in the staging of his own exit from the world.  But not everyone agreed.  
Nadège, Monsieur Rami’s primary care physician, the only attending of Maghrebi origin 
involved in the case, and the daughter of a good friend of Madame Rami, was furious with her 
colleagues and insisted that her patient had died a “good” death precisely because his 
autonomous individual desires had been fully realized. 
On the face of it, this case sounds simple.  It looks like additional proof, if such a thing 
were necessary, of the triumph of what is often called “neoliberal” governmentality and 
subjectivities in Europe (Mahmud 2014; Muehlebach 2012; Shoshan 2016; Zigon 2011) and in 
biomedicine (B. Good 2010; Gordon 1988; Rose 1998, 2007; Drought and Koenig 2002).  
Although there is tremendous diversity in how scholars talk about neoliberalism (Ganti 2014), 
 
2 In the context of southern French cancer care, the palliative care team I got to know dealt almost exclusively 
with patients for whom no “curative” treatments were left. These patients were not always actively dying, but 
palliative care is still sufficiently stigmatized and scarce in France that it is not (yet) part of treatment regimes 
for chronic conditions. 
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here I am referring to the widespread presumption that changes in contemporary capitalism and 
state practice produce and presuppose individualized, rational, autonomous, self-making subjects 
who use language in transparently referential ways (Abu El-Haj 2012; Jean Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2009; Muehlebach 2012; Rose 2007; Rudnyckyj 2009; Shoshan 2016).  And indeed, 
despite deep disagreements, everyone in this story seemed to measure the quality of Monsieur 
Rami’s death against precisely these neoliberal metrics.   
But viewing the Rami case as evidence of neoliberal hegemony may be a superficial 
reading of a more complex reality.  By tracing out the disagreements and frustrations that 
accompanied care providers’ attempts to orchestrate a “good” death for Monsieur Rami, I show 
just how unsettled foundational assumptions about subjectivity, personhood, and language 
actually were among the Center’s diverse care providers.  Like many terminal patients at the 
Center, Monsieur Rami was hospitalized in an internal medicine ward under the care of an 
internist (Nadège), but was also seen by an interdisciplinary team of (mobile) palliative care 
specialists, including a social worker, psychologist, physical therapist, nutritionist, pain 
specialist, and nurse.  Staff meetings about his case included the oncologists, internists, and 
nurses from the internal medicine ward as well as a representative team of specialists from 
palliative care.  Across these differences in department, training, and specialization, doctors and 
nurses did sometimes describe Monsieur Rami as a (potentially) autonomous, choosing 
individual in need of transparent communication about his prognosis and diagnosis.  But such 
characterizations often served as ideological weapons in battles care providers were fighting 
amongst themselves over their own contradictory ethical commitments.  Furthermore, both 
inside and outside palliative care, some of those ethical commitments were not about cultivating 
autonomous choice and self-care.  For some care providers, talking about Monsieur Rami in 
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terms of thwarted individual autonomy served as a defense of the paternalistic decision-making 
required for an appropriately “palliated” death.  For Nadège too, the language of individual 
autonomy was strategic, but she used it in defense of a different project.  After trying to convince 
Monsieur Rami’s medical team that he and his family should be allowed to cope as a tightly knit, 
hierarchical collectivity, she finally got fed up with the nursing staff’s racism.  At that point she 
began invoking a kind of culturally-conditioned autonomy in order to justify the Rami family’s 
collective denial and subjective entanglements.   
Attending to these ambivalent and inconsistent evocations of individual autonomy pushes 
back against abstract Foucaultian arguments about neoliberal governmentality and subjectivity in 
the West (Rose 2007, 1998).  It also raises questions about a more subtle ethnographic literature 
that finds neoliberal hegemony even in contexts where social actors think they are resisting both 
atomization and autonomous self-mastery.  For example, Andrea Muehlebach (2012) argues that 
Catholics and Communists in Italy inadvertently enact care in ways that justify individual 
responsibility for collective well-being, and Jarrett Zigon (2011) suggests that the Russian 
Orthodox Church unintentionally helps intravenous drug users involved in rehabilitation 
programs embody forms of self-care and responsibility that are most adaptive within neoliberal 
Russia.  French palliative care and its practitioners could be used to tell a similar story.  The 
impetus for the late 1980s institutionalization of French palliative care came primarily from 
Catholic priests and clinicians who studied with Dame Cicely Saunders, the Anglican founder of 
Saint Christopher’s Hospice in London (Castra 2003), and early advocates of palliative care in 
France were often Church figures (Verspieren 1988, 1984).  Most significantly, institutionalized 
French palliative care has long been overtly hostile to discourses about autonomy and choice that 
are commonly used to promote euthanasia and greater individual “mastery” over death 
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(d’Ornellas 2015).  It instead promotes a relational and “accompanied” death (Gaille and Horn 
2016).  But are such discourses about deeply relational forms of human subjectivity and non-
individualized morality merely ideological, ultimately supporting reductive neoliberal 
hegemonies?  
The Rami case shows otherwise.  I show this by attending not only to what care givers 
said, but also to the assumptions care providers seemed to make about the very nature of 
language and what it does.  There has been considerable work, both inside and outside medical 
anthropology, on what Judith Irvine and Susan Gal call “language ideologies,” meaning, among 
other things, cultural presumptions about the ontology of language, including the relationship 
between words and things-in-the-world (Brada 2013; Briggs 2005; Gal and Irvine 2000; Keane 
2007).  Around questions of death and dying, scholars have paid particular attention to 
assumptions about what diagnostic and prognostic words can do to patients (Christakis 1999; 
Frank et al. 2002; M.-J. D. Good et al. 1993; M.-J. D. V. Good 1990; Gordon and Paci 1997; 
Harris, Shao, and Sugarman 2003; Livingston 2012).  Much of the scholarship in medical 
anthropology on this subject seems to presume that in places and among people fully penetrated 
by biomedical norms, cultural assumptions separate language from the world, making it purely 
referential and informational (Brada 2013, 438).  In contrast, at the geographical as well as 
cultural edges of biomedical knowledge, words are thought to shape the material world itself and 
thus impact health outcomes (Frank et al. 2002; Gordon and Paci 1997; Harris, Shao, and 
Sugarman 2003; Livingston 2012).  Even when scholars of North Atlantic medicine have 
attended to the care doctors take with language, they shy away from linking that care to 
fundamental assumptions about words and the world (Brada 2013).  Instead, this linguistic care 
is associated with the work of shaping patient “choices” (Drought and Koenig 2002; Kaufman 
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2015, 2005, 2002), avoiding responsibility for particular outcomes (Christakis 1999), or 
“preserving hope” against all odds (M.-J. D. V. Good 1990).   My story complicates this picture.  
As clinicians worked to orchestrate what they understood as an ethically acceptable death for 
Monsieur Rami, they tacked back and forth between suggesting that words did, or should, 
transparently reference things in the world and suggesting that words had material consequences.  
In a medical context seemingly fully penetrated by biomedical norms and assumptions, doctors 
and nurses seemed to be operating between at least two different language ideologies—one 
referential and the other performative—suggesting that the way care providers imagined patient 
personhood and subjectivity was hardly given or stable.   
 
Palliative care and the “crisis” of French medicine 
Monsieur Rami’s case could be told as a way of exploring death and dying in French 
palliative care.  For the purposes of this paper, however, I focus on one specific aspect of 
Monsieur Rami’s experience: his care providers’ impasses and anxieties around ethical action, 
individual choice, and patient autonomy.  But why, then, take palliative care and palliative care 
providers as an ethnographic object?  I did not initially intend to study palliative care.  Instead, as 
France transitions between an openly paternalist approach to medicine toward a greater emphasis 
on patient rationality, autonomy, and choice,3 I wondered how doctors working in domains 
driven by patient requests—notably assisted reproduction—negotiated and imposed ethical limits 
on patients and practices.  As I began doing participant observation with an interdisciplinary 
hospital ethics committee at a large public hospital in southern France, palliative care nurses and 
 
3 French medicine has legally and ethically taken the anti-paternalist turn much more recently than medicine in other 
parts of the North Atlantic world.  It is only since 2002 that patients are guaranteed the right to see their own 
medical records, and patients still play only a minor role in decision-making about medical care (De Vries, 
Dingwall, and Orfali 2009). 
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doctors approached me, insisting that they wrestled with ethics and autonomy in ways that others 
(including ethics committees) did not.  I therefore found myself spending about 6 months 
attending staff meetings and workshops with three different teams of palliative care nurses and 
physicians based in publicly-financed French hospitals in a medium-sized Mediterranean city. 
While shadowing the nurses and physicians working in and around palliative care, I did not 
observe patients (like Monsieur Rami) or staff relationships with patients; instead, I focused on 
how care providers trained interns, why and when they argued with one another, and how and 
why they struggled to shape the ways that staff in other medical domains thought about and 
handled patients.  
In retrospect, it is not surprising that palliative care providers perceived themselves as 
deeply engaged with ethics and autonomy.  Palliative care in France emerged as a reaction 
against the fantasies of physician omnipotence that produced both “archarnement 
therapeutique”—the endless deployment of technology in hopeless cases—and/or physician-
driven euthanasia performed with so-called “lithic cocktails” (Carnevale and Bibeau 2007; 
Castra 2003; Moulin 2000).  In interviews with me, palliative care providers consistently defined 
themselves in opposition to what they called the French physicians’ “God complex” and stressed 
their own contrasting anti-paternalistic, patient-centered approach to care.  Although anti-
paternalism does not have to rely on liberal notions of autonomy, many palliative care providers 
talked about their work and their patients in ways that emphasized rights-bearing, internalized 
selves.  They insisted that they were safeguarding patients’ “right” to minimal pain and robust 
pain management, as well as the “right” to limit unwanted “heroic” medical measures (M.-H. 
Salamagne and Thominet 2015).  In addition, care providers described patients as having a 
conflicted but interiorized self that required carefully curated opportunities for self-realization 
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and self-expression.  This was particularly true for the psychologists involved in palliative care, 
who encouraged patients to share (and preferably narrate) their life projects, fears, and desires 
(Castra 2003; Memmi 2003, 2000).  Encouraging this kind of self-presentation presumes that 
language can, first and foremost, “align presumed interior states and external self-
representations” (Brada 2013, 441).  And since talk was supposed to reveal and make accessible 
what was always already occurring deep within patient psyches, inciting this kind of self-
presentation both assumed and helped produce patients who were self-reflexive and in 
possession of deeply individualized interiorities. 
And yet if palliative care providers seemed to embrace the self-reflexive, sovereign 
subject as a way of pushing back against the “bad old days” of paternalism, many also distrusted 
biomedical understandings of individuality and autonomy.  This distrust was perhaps 
overdetermined by palliative care’s longstanding fight with the French “right to die” movement, 
which makes its moral claims through arguments about furthering patient “autonomy” (M.-H. 
Salamagne 2015; Zittoun 2015).  Laure, the head of palliative care at the Center, explained that 
she was wary of the “excessive individualism” she saw in shifts towards global norms around 
“consent” and “autonomy.”  She feared this individualism would allow people to make their own 
rules and ignore shared moral frameworks, undermining the foundation of what makes people 
“human.”  She also did not like the idea of leveling hierarchies between doctors and patients 
because such leveling rested on the illusion that a patient could autonomously “choose” among 
treatment options if given complete and transparent information.  Paul, a former colleague of 
Laure’s who was working in a different palliative care center, agreed with the idea that 
autonomous choice in critical medical care is chimerical.  He summed up his moral position as 
“ethical paternalism:” “I don’t like a fully hierarchical relationship with patients.  But I don’t like 
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the autonomy thing either.  I have knowledge that I am willing to put into service through 
discussion and sharing.  But I am not responsive to the ‘demands’ of patients.”  As Laure and 
Paul suggest, many palliative care doctors imagined themselves as fighting both paternalism and 
bioethics models of human subjectivity.  Such models made doctors mere service providers who 
were judged by their responsiveness to putatively transparent patient demands.  Accepting such 
demands at face value opened the door to an “anything goes” morality; it also transformed 
doctor-patient relations into a series of (more or less transparent) communicative acts focused on 
facilitating patient “choice” (Mol 2008).   
These tensions between anti-paternalistic, patient-centered norms, on the one hand, and 
hostility toward patient demands and choice-driven autonomy, on the other, have existed within 
French palliative care from its genesis in the mid-1980s.  But they became more pronounced 
right before my arrival in the field in January 2017.  In 2016, the French parliament revised the 
2005 loi Leonetti governing end-of-life care (Leonetti 2005).  The 2005 law was well-regarded 
by palliative care specialists because it walked a tightrope between patient autonomy and 
allocating moral and decisional responsibility to doctors.  It encouraged patients to write advance 
directives, but made it easy for physicians to ignore them.  It facilitated treatment refusal for 
dying patients, but required doctors to talk people with longer life expectancies out of such 
refusals.  And it formally authorized a long-standing physician practice of using potentially fatal 
sedatives on patients as long as the medical intent was to temporarily palliate refractory 
symptoms, not to kill (Leonetti 2005; Verspieren 2005).  The 2016 law, in contrast, went much 
further toward “choice” and “autonomy,” partially fulfilling then socialist President François 
Hollande’s 2012 campaign pledge to give French patients more control over their own deaths 
(Hirsch 2014, 19–20).  Much to the dismay of many of the care providers I got to know, the 2016 
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law allowed dying patients to request sedations that were intended (in the long run) to be 
terminal.  Fragile patients had often died while temporarily sedated; but this was seen as very 
different from a patient insisting at the outset that he or she did not want to wake up.  The new 
law also made it harder for physicians to contest or ignore advance directives (Claeys and 
Leonetti 2016). 
All of these shifts and debates made palliative care particularly fertile ground for 
exploring wider tensions within French medicine around ethics, autonomy, and language 
ideologies.  In this context, palliative care specialists from a range of religious and spiritual 
backgrounds had become particularly attuned to and even defensive about their own ambivalence 
around patient autonomy.  In conversations with me they mobilized arguments about autonomy 
seemingly to beat the autonomists, particularly those seen as defenders of euthanasia.4   For 
example, Geneviève, a pioneer of palliative care and a lapsed Protestant, told me that people who 
requested terminal sedation were not actually asking to be killed.  Instead, their “real” desires 
had been silenced by pain, isolation, or psychological distress.  If palliative care specialists 
responded to the suffering at the root of the request for euthanasia, the request itself would 
disappear.  Similarly, Laure, who described herself as an atheist humanist, explained that patients 
were asking to be terminally sedated because they worried about being a financial and emotional 
burden for family members.  Rather than understand this as a manifestation of distributed 
suffering (Hannig 2017), Laure saw fears of external disapproval—as well as actual familial 
pressures—deforming patients’ true internal wishes.  And Paul, a left-wing Catholic, was 
convinced that euthanasia was the government’s solution to out-of-control medical spending.  In 
Paul’s account, powerful economic forces disciplined individual desires in a direction he called 
 
4 This is actually a relatively common strategy among anti-euthanasia activists, who may both be wary of elevating 
“choice” and “autonomy” to an ultimate good and nonetheless contest in Kantian terms the “autonomy” of those 
who request euthanasia (Gandsman 2016; Gandsman and Burnier 2014). 
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“au low cost,” a phrase that when pronounced in French is identical to the French word for 
Holocaust.  Palliative care doctors were fighting fire with fire, using autonomy as a conscious 
ideological weapon against the growing echoes of the “right to death” or “death with dignity” 
arguments in the French public sphere.  
The pressure from a rising “right to die” movement may have overdetermined palliative 
care doctors’ situational embrace of Kantian conceptions of autonomy, leading them to dismiss 
requests that bore traces of external influence or pressure (Laidlaw 2013, 164–65).  But it also 
increased the pressure to show that patients died well in palliative care.   This pressure created its 
own ethical complexities, particularly when a painless death was not a patient/family’s primary 
objective.  Many of the situations that care providers described as ethically complex involved 
patients who refused to be temporarily sedated despite symptoms (particularly respiratory 
distress) that caregivers thought were unbearable.5  As a result, if many providers talked about 
palliative care as a kind of “choose your own adventure,” where patients got to call the shots and 
nurses and doctors worked hard to facilitate the self-realization of the dying, physician-
recommended temporary sedation was fast becoming an ethical norm for a “good” death.  
 
The problem of language in caring for Monsieur Rami 
As is clear from these longstanding moral and philosophical impasses around dying well 
in palliative care, the Rami case did not create the tensions caregivers experienced or the 
language in which they expressed those tensions.  The case was, in the words of palliative care 
psychologist at the Center, “banal” in the sense that it raised very typical ethical dilemmas for 
 
5 Internists and palliative care physicians at the Cancer Center were still talking about the case of a young man who, 
several years before I arrived, had died from lung cancer.  While suffocating, he continuously refused to be sedated.  
In the end, the night team could not bear to watch him “suffer,” so they administered morphine without his consent.  
While everyone was uncomfortable with the violation of the patient’s will, they were equally in agreement that the 
young man’s situation was unbearable. 
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care providers.  But it raised those issues in particularly dramatic ways.  From the very 
beginning, care providers worried about language and its role in making the Rami case 
complicated.  In staff meetings, doctors, nurses, and aids gave confused and contradictory 
accounts about Monsieur and Madame Rami’s (in)ability to understand/communicate in French 
and/or Arabic. Different doctors and nurses seemed to see very different realities in the Berber-
speaking Rami family, and most particularly in Madame Rami.  Sometimes even the same care 
provider saw different realities at different times.  Nadège, for example, at times worried about 
Monsieur and Madame Rami’s limited French and at other times insisted that both were capable 
of understanding and even speaking French.  Natasha, the ward’s only Arabic-speaking nurse 
who translated for the family whenever she could, offered similar assessments of the couple’s 
Arabic.  She insisted in staff meetings that Madame Rami “understands [her] very well” in 
Arabic while also worrying that her Arabic translations were not enough because it was still a 
second language for the family.  For other care providers, the Ramis were incompetent in French 
and therefore linguistically and culturally inaccessible. 
Those who found the Ramis incompetent cited the everyday ways that Madame Rami 
cared for her husband as evidence.  According to the nurses responsible for Monsieur Rami, his 
wife woke him up to feed him, touched him constantly to see if he was warm, and prevented him 
from dozing off.  She and her children asked for help from the staff constantly.  As Eurydice, the 
head nurse on the ward, explained: “They [the family] say—he’s tired!  Do something!  He’s 
hot!  Do something!”  They even asked for additional chemotherapy while talking about 
alternative therapies, including a “fruit that cures cancer.”  Care providers worried that these 
comments pointed to the family’s informational deficit about Monsieur Rami’s condition, 
suggesting that there were problems with translation and/or transparency in communication.  
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Anne-Marie, a very experienced palliative care nurse, returned repeatedly in staff meetings to the 
trope of “impasse,” insisting that the team needed to find a way to “inform” the patient and his 
wife of his dire prognosis in order to “get things moving” toward greater acknowledgement of 
decline and death.  This push to get patients and their families “moving” toward articulating 
recognition of impending death is central to the socio-psychological work associated with 
palliative care on both sides of the Atlantic.  This work assumes and helps create transparent and 
referential language among medical professionals about disease progression and prognosis and, 
most crucially in this context, among patients pushed to externalize putatively internal 
transformations and states. 
 But at the beginning of Monsieur Rami’s stay, care providers also sometimes undermined 
the very notion that the Rami “impasse” was a problem of thwarted communication.  Nadège, 
Monsieur Rami’s internist and primary care physician, tried to explain to her colleagues that 
putatively transparent communication about illness was not the only way of “knowing” (Samuels 
2019).  She noted that while the Rami family certainly did not talk to Monsieur Rami about his 
disease, he nonetheless “knew” what was happening: “He knows that he feels something; he 
knows that he’s exhausted.”  Similarly, while Eurydice worried openly about how to make sure 
that the family understood Monsieur Rami’s diagnosis and prognosis, she also suggested other 
ways of interpreting their behavior—notably through the register of denial and even the 
subjunctive possibility of cure (B. Good and Good 1994).  Defying the open scorn around the 
“cancer curing fruit,” Eurydice, riffing on the theme of Muhammad and the mountain, 
responded: “He can’t go to the fruit but maybe the fruit can come to him…  We need to respect 
his beliefs.  We don’t want him to think that we are hermetic.  Let’s give him the fruit.  I’m only 
sometimes a Cartesian.”  For Eurydice, “communication” at that moment was not about 
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denotation, let alone the facilitation of rational and autonomous choice.  Rather language was 
perhaps better understood in a more ritualistic sense—as part of the work of creating an “as if” 
frame in which the family could live the end of Monsieur Rami’s life on their own terms 
(Seligman et al. 2008).  If that meant endlessly deferring transparent and referential 
communication about the patient’s impending death, so be it. 
In these exchanges, care providers seemed to echo Anne-Marie Mol’s distinction between 
“care” and “choice” (2008).  In a “logic of care” frame, doctors collaborate in open-ended ways 
with patients who are struggling to live with and in bodies that may be very difficult to control 
and impossible to cure.  In contrast, the “logic of choice” sets up limited, transactional relations 
that are teleologically focused on autonomous decision-making.  Allowing patients and their 
families to live with disease rather than simply facilitating end-of-life “choices” was certainly 
how palliative caregivers typically talked about their role vis-à-vis dying patients.  I would 
further suggest that this commitment to life with disease came with all sorts of assumptions 
about what language is and how patient subjectivities work.  Here I want to highlight a few 
discussions among care providers that illustrate these entanglements.  During a hospital ethics 
subcommittee meeting, Laure led an hour-long discussion about how to talk to patients about 
palliative care.  What words could they use?  Did “accompanying services” [soins 
d’accompaniement] work?  What about “comfort services” [soins de comfort]?  Did terms like 
these conceal the truth?  Were euphemisms necessary?  Michèle, a psychologist and at the time a 
member of France’s national ethics committee, responded: “Saying things [dire des choses] is 
not necessarily about Truth—it’s a truth.  You are not really lying when you do not say palliative 
care.”  Laure responded: “There is this terrible Anglo-Saxon idea of [linguistic] ‘transparency.’  I 
see it all the time because my boss trained in Quebec and Boston.”  Michèle noted that they have 
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long learned not just to change the words they use with children, but also the tone and rhythm of 
their speech, noting that doctors should do the same thing for “patients to whom they are 
announcing a catastrophe.  It’s not hypocrisy—we do things with words.” 
Michèle and Laure worried that the term “palliative care” could “do things” in an 
Austinian sense (Austin 1975) because they—and many others in palliative care—thought 
talking about prognoses or diagnoses with patients was a potentially dangerous performative act.  
During a medical school class devoted to palliative care, Geneviève—the lapsed Protestant and 
key figure in French palliative care—explained this to her third year medical students:  
We cannot live in death.  It is unthinkable.  There are times when questions 
[about the end of life] will be asked, but then [the patient] is going to talk about 
going on a trip to Tahiti; they’ve never been and now is the time to go.  So death 
is not simple.  And you cannot worry if you have informed the patient and then 
the patient seems to do an about face and starts talking about a life project.  To 
live, you need a project.  It might be Tahiti or just next weekend.  But you need 
to keep that door open.  You can tell them what you have to say; but then you 
leave the door open. 
 
A student then asked: “Should we make people understand that they are a lost cause?  Or should 
we do everything we can to make them hang on?”  Geneviève responded:  
We never make an annonce [diagnosis and/or prognosis] like that.  When people 
ask, we do not really know what they are asking.  Sometimes people ask if they 
are going to die.  So you should say: why do ask that?  And then they say, because 
I do not feel well.   So then we say: yes the situation is serious [grave] but we are 
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going to do everything we can.  Not to mean that we are going to heal you.  That 
isn’t true.  But just to leave the door open… “ 
Regardless of what the student thought before or after this exchange, her question and 
Geneviève’s answer sutured a patient’s ability to “hang on” to the physician’s relative silence 
around diagnosis and prognosis.  Viewing both words and silences as consequential acts meant 
that doctors were always looking for the “right” moment to break bad diagnostic news.  And 
palliative care doctors fully acknowledged that such a moment sometimes never came.  This 
suggests that patients were not imagined as autonomous agents making independent decisions 
through referential language, but rather as subjects roiled with contradictory, even irrational 
psychological impulses and caught in powerful webs of words and relations that might save or 
harm them. 
 But as care providers became increasingly anxious about Madame Rami’s “inappropriate” 
behavior and her seeming ignorance of her husband’s condition, the space for “care” and its 
associated language ideologies diminished and the emphasis on “choice,” with its assumptions 
about patient autonomy, cognitive knowledge, and rational decision-making increased.  At the 
same time, Nadège’s role seemed to shift.  From having been a reporter on the family’s 
“cultural” issues who sounded much like Eurydice or other members of the palliative care team, 
she became what her colleagues called an “obstacle” to progress.  In particular, Anne-Marie, the 
senior palliative care nurse who worried about the “impasse” with the Ramis, later blamed 
Nadège for making “everything seem impossible.”  And indeed, Nadège found herself saying no 
to her colleagues quite often in the following weeks.  When Eurydice first suggested getting the 
whole family together in order to finally dispel any doubts about Monsieur Rami’s diagnosis and 
prognosis, Nadège simply ignored the proposition.  She changed the subject, commenting that 
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Monsieur Rami’s youngest son had just become his healthcare proxy.  She said the young man, 
who spoke fluent French, would not be able to “fully assume his responsibilities” because of his 
junior position within the family.  When Anne-Marie re-articulated Eurydice’s proposition a 
week later, Nadège objected strenuously and vociferously, arms folded stubbornly across her 
chest.  “No!  There is a daughter who is psychologically fragile.  And culturally, they cannot 
understand making a diagnosis and prognosis in front of the patient and not just to the family in 
the hallway.”  Nadège added that the family was pudique, meaning reluctant to share intimate 
information.  This would make it hard for them to talk about Monsieur Rami’s impending death, 
let alone help the doctors break the news to the patient himself.  Echoing her previous concerns 
about Monsieur Rami’s healthcare proxy, Nadège explained that the youngest son could not 
“inform” his mother.  Although he apparently found his mother’s behavior problematic and 
sympathized with the concerns of the medical team, he was too junior a family member to 
criticize her or tell her about Monsieur Rami’s impending death.   
 In contrast, Nadège’s colleagues started to dig in their heels around the necessity of 
transparent communication.  If the week before Eurydice had been happy to facilitate procuring a 
cancer-curing fruit, things had now changed.  And she was hardly alone in her insistence on 
“better” communication with the Ramis.  In one particularly heated staff meeting, Anne-Marie, 
Eurydice, and a nurse from internal medicine unsuccessfully tried to convince Nadège and 
Natasha, the team’s only Arabic-speaking nurse, that referential language was both the cause of 
and solution to the Ramis’ problems:6 
Anne-Marie: “Has anyone told her that her husband is going to die?” 
Nadège: “We’ve told her kids, but not her.  There’s the language problem.” 
 
6 In order to better protect patient confidentiality, I never recorded staff meetings.  This exchange has been 
reconstructed from handwritten field notes taken at the time. 
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Anne-Marie: “We need to move forward here.  Why would she not continue to stimulate 
him [since she doesn’t know that he’s going to die]?” 
Internal medicine nurse: “Maybe she doesn’t know not to stimulate him?” 
Nadège: “There’s no communication in the family.” 
…… 
Internal medicine nurse: “His wife answers questions on his behalf.  His children and 
friends read the Qur’an.  They are not talking to exchange information. They are just 
getting ready for the benediction chant.  It’s an obligation because it’s Ramadan.” 
Natasha: “Not at all!  They are reading to him because he’s sick.  It’s just for him, the 
benediction.  And they are not interested in seeing an imam to share anything.” 
Nadège: “He doesn’t say what he wants.  He asks no questions.  He just says that he is 
tired.  I tell him that there is no medicine for the sickness; [I told him] that it will just 
keep growing…  The darker son was the first to ask how long this will last; I won’t be 
able to get a dialogue going in this family.” 
Anne-Marie to Nadège: “What do you need to help take care of him?  Do you need us 
[the palliative care team] to deal with the wife who stimulates him too much?” 
Internal medicine nurse: “You need someone to translate for you.  The wife will say ‘yes’ 
[to whatever you say].  But then afterwards [she will do whatever she wants]...” 
Anne-Marie [frustrated with the nurse’s fatalism]: “But we haven’t tried!  What happens 
if he dies?  Her reaction is important!” 
Natasha: “If he dies, I’m not really sure that there will be a problem.” 
Eurydice, furious: “Well then!  We might as well just wait until he dies!!” 
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Natasha: “Karima [name of another nurse] speaks to them too.  She speaks Berber, and I 
do not.  The wife asks about another patient whom they have known for a long time—the 
families exchange a lot.”  [The implication being that a member of this other family could 
“break” the news to the Rami family]. 
Eurydice, even more furious: “NO!  We are talking about a woman who is behaving in a 
totally inappropriate way for the situation.  I don't know if it will help to tell her, but we 
have to try!” 
 There is quite a bit going on in this exchange, perhaps including the interactional creation 
of anger and anxiety (Capps and Ochs 1995).  But here I want to focus on the way language 
ideologies divide Nadège and Natasha from their colleagues.  Nadège—a tiny powerhouse 
glowering at her colleagues with her arms crossed and lips pursed—seemed to encourage 
everyone to renounce a model of consent and care in which patients were responsible for 
cognitively knowing and individually acting on a diagnosis or prognosis.  She had told Monsieur 
Rami that his condition would only get worse.  But she had given his children considerably more 
information about their father’s prognosis, knowing full well that they would keep that 
information from their father and mother to protect them from hearing words that might cause 
lasting harm.  This is why Nadège insisted that there was never going to be a “dialogue” in the 
family and blocked her colleagues’ attempts to orchestrate family-wide disclosure.  Through her 
stubborn opposition, she was reminding her colleagues of something many of them already knew 
and yet seemed to have forgotten: agency and perhaps even autonomy can be “distributed” as 
well as individual, particularly when patients’ lives and ethical sensibilities are inseparable from 
those of the friends and/or family who care for them (Fainzang 2016; Livingston 2012).  
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 Natasha, the Arabic-speaking nurse, took this even further.  Nadège was convinced that 
the family was not “communicating” and would never engage in a “dialogue” because they were 
committed to distributed agency.  Natasha insisted that they were communicating, but not in a 
referential way.  This is most obvious in her response to the internal medicine nurse, who 
denounced the Rami family’s use of Quranic readings as a retreat from real dialogue (“they are 
not talking to exchange information”).  In the context of a hyper-secular French hospital, this 
comment suggested that religious speech was empty, all form and no content and therefore 
useless as a form of exchange (Asad 2003; Seligman et al. 2008).  But Natasha offered a 
different account of how language might work.  She suggested that the Ramis’ textual citation 
practices were neither empty words nor a sign of a fanatical commitment to Islam (“they are not 
interested in seeing the imam”).  Instead, they were using text and prayer as mediating objects 
that facilitated meaningful and culturally comfortable interactions with Monsieur Rami (“it’s just 
for him, the benediction”) (Keane 2007).  Contrary even to Nadège, Natasha thought the Ramis 
were engaged in an exchange that was perfectly appropriate in a certain kind of Muslim family.  
As a result, she questioned the whole premise of the team’s anxiety around Monsieur Rami: there 
was not going to be a “breakdown” or “crisis” when he died.  Instead, he, his wife, and his 
family members were coping with impending death by engaging in ritualized everyday routines 
that were a kind of subjunctive denial of death (B. Good and Good 1994; Samuels 2018). 
 But these openings toward alternative understandings of language were being countered 
by arguments that made very different assumptions.  In the exchange cited above, Anne-Marie 
and Eurydice insisted in different ways on communicative transparency, making it the path to the 
knowledge they now suggested was an important component of a “good” death.  Back-grounding 
palliative care’s commitment to life with disease in the face of the Rami family’s social and 
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cultural dynamics, both claimed that Madame Rami’s ignorance—not her denial—enabled her 
“totally inappropriate” care of her husband.  She was “stimulating” him because she had a 
misplaced hope that oriented her toward an impossible distant rather than more realistic short-
term future.  This could—both nurses hoped—be corrected with better information coming from 
the proper channels: Center care providers, not fellow patients.  For Anne-Marie and Eurydice, 
Madame Rami’s behavior could best be understood as a transparent reflection of choices driven 
by (deficient) knowledge; the question was simply which cultural tools would allow efficient 
communication with the patient and his wife.  At the same time, there was growing hostility 
towards Nadège’s attempt to maintain the status quo.  Both Eurydice and Anne-Marie raised 
their voices and offered catastrophic scenarios (“What if he dies!”  “Well then we might as well 
just wait until he dies!”) in the hopes of getting Nadège on board with their plan and its attendant 
semiotic assumptions.   
 
Autonomy denied and realized? 
 By the following staff meeting, Monsieur Rami had died under conditions that challenged 
the personal and professional ethics of those who had long been debating his family dynamics.  
In a staff meeting dedicated to making sense of what happened with his case, Laure gave a blow 
by blow of the hours preceding his death.  On a Friday, a few short weeks after his initial 
hospitalization, Monsieur Rami entered serious respiratory distress.  According to Laure, 
there was this sudden realization in this Muslim family of his impending death, 
the death of a father and a husband.  Françoise [the ward’s on-call oncologist] told 
them he was going to die and this closed them off completely.  She did it rather 
brutally, perhaps because she was taken aback and extremely frustrated by the 
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way this entire family united in the room with this man challenged her power.  
And what happened was that the femme âgée [Madame Rami] asked us to stop all 
medical treatment—she wanted us to pull back, to stop pain medication because 
he was now in the hands of Allah.  I tried to push her to the end of her logic, to 
see exactly where she was willing to stop.  But her position was incoherent and 
her children tried to protect her, saying that it was way too much for her right now 
to deal with the impending death that had just been announced and the additional 
medical treatments.  She didn’t even want him to have morphine, although he had 
long been on it.   
For Laure, the situation was untenable.  She noted with horror that the family “even asked a 
social worker to organize his [Monsieur Rami’s] rapatriement [return to his country of origin] 
while he was lying there gasping for air.”  A nurse, explaining the anger and frustration of the 
medical staff witnessing Monsieur Rami’s distress, chimed in: “The staff felt like the situation 
was just going to explode if it kept going.”   
 But Laure also made clear that she had no intention of letting the situation continue.  She 
was convinced that Madame Rami had made a decision that did not reflect her husband’s 
interests or will.  Laure explained: “Our plan was not to let him suffer in the long run.  We were 
going to give the wife some time; we were going to respect her point of view.  And we hoped 
that once she realized that we had respected her, she would start to respect us and follow our 
advice.  In the end that was not what happened; but that is because he died so quickly.”  What 
Laure meant was that after respecting Madame Rami’s “point of view” for a few hours, the 
palliative care team fully intended to medicate if not “temporarily” sedate Monsieur Rami.  No 
one at the meeting thought this a shocking proposition, despite the family’s obvious opposition.  
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For palliative care providers, dying fully conscious of respiratory distress was both undesirable 
and undesired.  From the team’s perspective, it was simply inconceivable that Madame Rami’s 
refusal of additional analgesics was part of a collective strategy for, once again, living with 
Monsieur Rami’s disease until death.  The family’s violation of one kind of palliative care norm 
through the refusal of analgesics authorized care providers’ violation of another norm: their 
commitment to simply “accompany” patients. 
 Given Laure’s decision to frame her discomfort with unpalliated death in terms of 
autonomy, it is not surprising that the post-mortem conversation hinged on the “logic of choice.”  
Notably, the team rehashed the missed communicative opportunities that many thought had 
plagued the relationship between the Rami family and staff from the very beginning.  Anne-
Marie suggested that they had missed an opportunity to work on the “spiritual” side of Monsieur 
Rami and his family.  Laure agreed, lamenting the lack of communication with the family and 
the failure to create trust during Monsieur Rami’s hospitalization.  For Laure and others, such 
communication and trust might have allowed the patient and his family to cheminent [move, 
literally go down the path] toward acceptance of Monsieur Rami’s condition and impending 
death.  This, in turn, might have prevented both the surprise and distrust that Laure and Anne-
Marie thought had led to an unsedated death.  It is important to note, however, that despite her 
frustration with these communication “failures,” Laure also almost immediately raised questions 
about whether fully transparent referential communication was ever possible.  She cautioned 
everyone about assuming that the Ramis’ “culture” or “religion” had created a communication 
problem.  For Laure, Madame Rami’s distressed “inch’allah” as she negotiated her husband’s 
agony and the team’s search to communicate through what they called “religion” and/or 
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“spirituality” were short cuts, part of the “poverty of discourse” in the face of suffering.  Words, 
she seemed to hint, were not and maybe could not be simple vehicles of meaning. 
 Laure and most of the palliative care team were focused on the communicative failures 
that supposedly prevented the Rami family from “knowing” Monsieur Rami was going to die.  
But Nadège, who was not present at the palliative care post-mortem, had a very different take. 
As Sarah, a senior palliative care nurse, explained during the palliative care post-mortem 
meeting, Nadège thought the relationship between the Ramis and the Center was tainted by 
racism.  When I spoke to Nadège a few weeks later, she elaborated, noting that she had 
overheard nurses referring to Monsieur Rami and his family with the inanimate, gender neutral, 
indexical pronoun ça, as in ça mange [the equivalent of “that thing eats”]; nurses had also locked 
the family room and the bathroom on the floor in order to avoid, as Nadège put it, seeing “those 
people with their têtes [phenotypical features], with their veils, with their evening meals.”  By 
the end of Monsieur Rami’s life, Nadège had become fully aware of the nurses’ discomfort and 
even disgust with the Rami family—a discomfort and disgust that she attributed to anti-
immigrant and notably anti-Muslim sentiment.   
 In response to what she called her “discovery” of racism at the Center and her long- 
standing opposition to the team’s problematization of the case, Nadège changed arguments.  
Before Monsieur Rami’s death, Nadège invoked “cultural difference” in order to make 
arguments about how the team should care for him.  These arguments presumed an irrational, 
reality-denying self, as well as the performative possibilities of language.  After his death, she 
minimized her discussion of cultural difference and maximized her focus on rational, interiorized 
autonomy.  In other words, she furiously countered both the racism at the Center and the move 
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away from “care” and towards “choice” with her own account of Monsieur Rami’s similarity to 
other patients and his mastery of his own death.    
 In a long interview a few weeks after Monsieur Rami’s death, she dismissed the concerns 
about language comprehension:  
with this patient…there was no team investment.  Since there was the language 
barrier, they did not even try to communicate.  But…  we have a patient of Polish 
origin, from Eastern Europe, and they [the nurses] managed to communicate 
[with him] in other ways.  [Monsieur Rami] had an accent that made things 
difficult; but [he] spoke French.  Yes, he spoke French.  And his wife, she 
understood; she could speak French.  But you needed to give her room to speak 
[prendre la parole] in French.   
 
Nadège also insisted that when Monsieur Rami had died, he and his wife knew full well what 
was happening.  Despite rumors at the Center, he had not sought out “traditional treatment,” 
meaning he had never questioned the rationale or efficacy of biomedicine.  And Nadège insisted 
that she “didn’t do anything differently [with him] than with other [patients].”  She had told him 
about his disease, how it would get worse, and that there was nothing that could be done to stop 
his decline.  In this story, Nadège assumed that Monsieur Rami was a patient just like any other.  
But rather than acknowledge that doctors needed to wrestle with what words might do to all 
patients, Nadège emphasized her purely referential language-use with Monsieur Rami: she gave 
him the knowledge required to operate in an individualized, consent-based framework.  As a 
result, Nadège strongly contested Laure’s account of Monsieur Rami’s death.  If Laure thought 
that Monsieur Rami and his family were “first discovering that this was a critical situation,” 
Nadège insisted that he had long known exactly what was going on.  That was why he went to 
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Morocco in the first place—not for the miracle cure his wife might have wanted for him, but 
because “he knew there were no more treatment options for him.” 
 Furthermore, he individually and autonomously orchestrated his death.  She explained:  
I didn’t have any trouble [telling him that he was going to die] because the family 
was observant and put themselves in the hands of God…  I tried to be as honest as 
possible.  But uh… Voila, these are people who clearly have their faith[….]  and 
who uhhh accepted what I could not do.  
She added that although 
[t]he [medical] team constantly criticized the family for stimulating him, turning 
him… he wanted this.  Each time he asked his family for a little water; he asked 
for a spoonful of yogurt; so as long as he could be in contact and in an exchange 
with them, he asked for things.   
Nadège reinterpreted the care her colleagues viewed as “inappropriate” and ignorant as a 
reflection of Monsieur Rami’s conscious and autonomous desire.  She explained his medical 
decisions in similar terms, as the work of autonomous and informed reflection.  On the Monday 
before he died, she saw him to clarify where things stood.  She had already told Monsieur 
Rami’s family that he would increasingly feel like he was suffocating.  She also explained the 
pharmaceutical options for coping with these symptoms.  The family refused everything.  
Nadège explained: “There is an expression in Arabic—we die the way we are born,” which 
means that “life” arrives and finishes unfolding “naturally.”   
And then I also talked about it with [Monsieur Rami].  It was his decision.  And I 
explained that if he wanted to be sedated, even if his family was against it, I 
needed to respond to his request.  What happened was not what I expected.  So 
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what he said was: ‘yes, I would like to sleep.  But what time are you going to 
wake me up?’  And his son did the translation to make sure that he understood 
that if he were sedated, he would not wake up again.  He pulled together all of his 
energy in order to say to me: ‘NO I do not want to be sedated.’  It was incredible.  
It was a categorical refusal.  There was no doubt.  There was no influence.  So 
[sedation] was unimaginable. 
 
In Nadège’s post-facto reading, Monsieur Rami’s will was fully realized.  It was a 
“cultured” will that could not be separated either from his religious dispositions or from his 
family’s close involvement in both his illness and death.   Given all of this, it was hardly 
surprising that his family refused medication and sedation in Monsieur Rami’s last hours.  And 
according to Nadège, this refusal allowed Monsieur Rami to continue to realize his own desires, 
doing things that would have been impossible had he been sedated.  “This was important to 
respect in the last hours—despite the distress it caused his medical team.  He could exchange 
with his family, he could exchange with the imam; he could realize his last actions so that he 
could die religiously and culturally in good terms… that was his will.”  After Monsieur Rami’s 
death, members of the Rami family did indeed thank the palliative care staff for the care their 
father had received. 
 
Conclusion 
In the end, Nadège and Laure came to diametrically opposed conclusions about the 
quality of Monsieur Rami’s death while nonetheless seeming to agree that a “good” death 
requires both cognitive knowledge and autonomous individual control over end-of-life 
“choices.”  Or did they?  Clearly, both Laure and Nadège mobilized an ideology of linguistic 
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transparency, individual autonomy, and choice in their attempts to manage colleagues and the 
Rami family.  But these ideological statements were in the service of care providers’ sometimes 
internally contradictory ethical projects, none of which consistently assumed the possibility or 
desirability of patient autonomy.  As we have seen, Monsieur Rami’s medical team was caught 
between the competing ethical demands of palliative care itself.  Although initially committed to 
allowing the Rami family to accompany their father/husband in their own way, that commitment 
ran up against ultimately greater commitments to 1) cheminement, the requirement that a patient 
and his or her family make “progress” towards acknowledging/narrating looming demise, and 2) 
palliated suffering.  Privileging these ethical commitments required invoking models of 
personhood and language that departed dramatically from a framework of “care” with its 
presumptions about death-defying “denial” and performative (and perhaps even deadly) language 
(Favret-Saada 1980).  Faced with a Maghrebi family whose practices many care providers found 
troubling, they instead used the language of information deficit and thwarted autonomy to justify 
proposing robust, paternalistic interventions, including forcing the family to listen to a prognosis 
and providing unwanted sedation at the very end of Monsieur Rami’s life.  Similarly, Nadège 
used the language of realized autonomy to further her own project of protecting the Rami family 
from the racist views of her colleagues.  Nadège may have begun the Rami case presuming both 
“distributed agency” and linguistic performativity.  But in order to maintain such a position in 
the face of her colleagues’ cultural and racial stereotypes, she began insisting that Monsieur 
Rami had cognitive knowledge of his own prognosis and had individually and autonomously 
articulated his end-of-life desires.  In other words, she defended a certain modality of caring 
collectively for a patient with a language of autonomy that defied the racialized assumptions of 
her colleagues.   
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The conscious invocation of knowledge, choice, and autonomy in defense of care 
providers’ ethical projects may encourage anthropologists to rethink how hegemonic neoliberal 
assumptions about personhood and language are in some fully biomedical settings, even in 
Western Europe.  Medical anthropologists, including Sharon Kaufman (Kaufman 1997, 2005, 
2015) and Barbara Koenig (Drought and Koenig 2002, 1996), have long told us that “choice” is 
not what is actually happening even in North Atlantic patient care, particularly in highly 
medicalized settings.  But in these contexts, doctors seem to remain deeply committed to a “logic 
of choice” even when most medical “choices” are in fact overdetermined by hospitals’ 
institutional logics and/or disease progression itself.  This does indeed suggest some form of 
neoliberal hegemony in the sense of a naturalized and often tacit frame for understanding the 
world (John Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 23).   
The Rami case, however, suggests something somewhat different.  Autonomous choice, 
transparently referential language, and cognitive knowledge were part of Center care providers’ 
fully conscious argumentative strategies.  As we have seen, for many at the Center, arguing for 
particular understandings of patient “autonomy” served as an important corrective to both the 
bad old days of “paternalism” and to the “extreme individualism” of those pushing for full self-
determination at death.  Deploying these conscious argumentative strategies in a context of 
conflicting norms and values certainly highlights the growing power of neoliberal discourse in 
contemporary French medicine.  But in many ways these ideological choices revealed the gap 
between “neoliberal” forms of human subjectivity and care providers’ much more ambivalent 
assumptions about language and personhood.  Palliative care in the Center was shot through with 
fears about the power of words, assumptions about human irrationality, and skepticism about the 
possibility or even desirability of individual autonomy, particularly in a medical context.  As a 
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result, while explicitly criticizing the failure of transparent communication with the Ramis, 
Center caregivers also constantly conjured up frameworks in which words could potentially kill 
and patients required protection and even paternalistic care.  Thus Laure could yell in frustration 
that the key to the Rami case was better communication while simultaneously acknowledging 
words were not and might never be transparent modes of communication.  She could also insist 
on the centrality of cognitive knowledge and autonomous decision-making while reminding 
everyone that sedating Monsieur Rami was in his best interests, regardless of how he or his 
family understood those interests.  This seems a far cry from Nikolas Rose’s assertion that, at 
least in the West, 
despite… ethical pluralism, …diverse [ethical] regimes operate within a single a 
priori: the ‘autonomization’ and ‘responsabilization’ of the self, the instilling of a 
reflexive hermeneutics which will afford self-knowledge and self-mastery, and 
the operation of all of this under the authority of experts who claim that the self 
can achieve a better and happier life through the application of scientific 
knowledge and professional skill (1998, 157).   
 To the contrary, there seems to be no single hegemonic framework that could explain all of the 
ways that care providers talked about and cared for Monsieur Rami.  In fact, the various ethical 
normativities at work among the Center’s medical staff seemed to rest on plural assumptions 
about personhood and language. 
 France and French medicine may be increasingly neoliberal; but at least some French care 
providers have not fully internalized neoliberal understandings of language and subjectivity.  The 
Rami case even shows that seemingly neoliberal frameworks for understanding what “care” is, 
what patients are, and what language does can actually be used in the service of ethical 
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normativities that hardly have the cultivation of the individualized, autonomized self at their 
core.  The chaos around Monsieur Ram’s death shows how, where, and why doctors and nurses 
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